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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN C. SHAW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ASHLEY L. ROBISON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
KOVO, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
DEC 9 197^ 
BRiGIIAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
No. 13823 
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation/ 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the District Court of Utah County, 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge. 
J. THOMAS GREENE and 
GIFFORD W. PRICE for 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Intervenor-
Respondent 
GORDON L. ROBERTS for 
PARTONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
no ev ±-i~ < - u — J — * • 
REED L. MARTINEAU and 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
700 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
DEAN E. CONDER for 
NIELSON, CONDER, HENRIOD & 
GOTTREDSON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT ONE. THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING A 
VALID CONTRACT FOR SALE WAS MADE PRIOR TO THE 
TIME THE OWNERS RESOLVED THEIR DIFFERENCES. 
Ore basis for appellant's petition iu± ren^arj-. 
a 4 > L misunderstanding concerning th<" effect 
trial court1s February order and a fc 
statements by the trial court consi dering the effect 
-2-
said order. This court stated: 
" . . . In February 1974, the court approv-
ed their recommendation of the receiver and 
directed him to proceed to accept the offer 
made by F.M.C. Pursuant thereto, the receiver 
entered into a contract with that company. 
Although the receiver again moved the 
court to approve the contract, he did not need 
to do so in order to make a binding contract. . . . 
Both F.M.C. and the receiver assumed that 
a final approval was necessary. However, the 
court had expressly directed the receiver to 
enter into a contract with F.M.C. (Advance sheet 
at page 3) 
This court then concluded that after a contract of 
sale has been made, the owners " . . . ought not be per-
mitted to defeat the rights of the purchasers by jointly 
asserting they have settled all differences." (Advance 
sheet at page 4) 
In reaching the foreoing conclusion, the court recog-
nized that in connection with judicial sales, where a sale 
is not regulated by statute, the trial court essentially 
makes its own rules subject to the use of sound discretion. 
Chapman vs. Schiller, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938). 
This court also indicated a court may establish a procedure 
requiring judicial confirmation offers made to a receiver 
or may offer as a receiver to accept an offer on specific 
terms and thus obviate the need for further judicial action. 
Once however, a court has determined to follow a particular 
-3-
procedure in making a judicial sale# it is obliged to 
adhere to its self-imposed rules. 
In finding that the trial court, by its February 
order, had authorized the receiver to enter into a con-
tract with the intervenor which was not subject to judicial 
confirmation/ this court apparently overlooked the fact that 
the trial court itself intended that; the contract was not to 
binding until such took place. 
This court failed to consider indications in the 
record that the trial court itself stated in March (after 
the order was entered) that by its February order the court 
had merely approved an order to negotiate, and had not 
approved any sale to intervenor. (R 310-311). See also 
Reply Brief of Appellants pages 15-22. 
The trial court was charged with establishing a fair 
and orderly procedure for the judicial sale. Since the 
trial court itself/ has indicated that no contract was 
approved or authorized by the February action/ this court 
erred in determining that a binding contract had in fact 
been authorized. This court's determination that a binding 
contract was formed by the authority granted the receiver 
in the February order is also undermined by the fact that 
the trial court itself deemed it necessary to confirm and 
approve the contract at a much later date. Since the trial 
4-
court was charged with formulating the procedure to be 
employed in the judicial sale and because it itself indi-
cated that a binding contract was not authorized by the 
February order, the trial court's action cannot be upheld 
on the basis that this court has utilized. The trial court 
must be required to adhere to the rules which it has itself 
established. 
The review of Equity proceedings is indicated in 
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277 488 P.2d 308, 310 (1971). 
In Equity proceedings: 
1 1
... It is the prerogative of the court to re-
view the evidence, to make its own findings, and to 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
when the ends of justice so require. However, due 
to the prerogatives and advantage position of the 
trial court, we pursue that broad authorization un-
der certain rules of review which are now well estab-
lished: its actions are indulged with the presumption 
of validity and correctness and the burden is upon 
the appellant to show a basis for upsetting them: 
either (1) that findings have been made when the events 
clearly preponderates the other way; or (2) there has 
been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial prejudicial error; or (3) 
that it appears plainly that there has been an abuse 
of discretion or inequality or injustice has resulted.11 
Regardless of which of the foregoing standards is ap-
» 
plicable, since no contract was authorized by the February 
order, the action of the trial court was clearly improper. 
Because there was no contract, since the intervenor had 
notice of the limited nature of its rights prior to 
-5-
confirmation and because the trial court expressly directed 
the owners to continue settlement negotiations, this court 
should not have affirmed the trial court action, particularly 
in light of the standard for review utilized in equity pro-
ceedings. 
POINT TWO. THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE CONTRACT PRESENTED TO THE COURT FOR FINAL 
APPROVAL IN MAY, 1974 WAS THE SAME AS THE FEBRUARY 
PROPOSAL. 
In its opinion this court stated: 
"The final agreement provided that the 
attorneys would have to make certain certi-
fications regarding title, etc. It was the 
same agreement which had been approved by 
the court on February 22, 1974, except for 
the mechanics of how it would be implemented." 
As indicated previously in this petition for rehearing, 
it is appellant's position that the court did not authorize 
an agreement by its February action as demonstrated by the 
subsequent actions of the trial court itself. In the event, 
however, that this court is not persuaded to that effect as 
a result of this petition for rehearing it should at a mini-
mum take steps to protect the interests of the owners since 
it is evident that the agreement submitted to the trial 
court in June, 1974 contains many substantial changes from 
the February proposal which are highly prejudicial to the 
rights of the owners. 
-6- m 
Even if, as this court determined, the owner's 
differences were resolved too late to preclude the 
intervenor from obtaining certain rights, the owners at 
a minimum were entitled to a fair price for their interests 
in accordance with the February proposal. The agreement 
approved by the trial court simply does not accord to the 
owners this protection. 
Appellants have previously made a detailed comparison 
of the changes between the February proposal and the later 
contract which demonstrate beyond question that the sub-
sequent contract does not comport with the earlier February 
proposal in numerous particulars that are unfair to the 
owners. This is demonstrated by the comparison of the 
February proposal (R-141-144) with a completed contract 
CR~189-259} as the major differences are highlighted by 
the appellant's summary (R-387). V 
Particularly onerous is the $75f000.00 escrow provided 
for in the completed contract but never mentioned or even 
alluded to in the February proposal. The escrow agent is 
to hold the funds for up to two years after the closing 
IR-390). Since the closing will not take place until after 
FCC approval, (a procedure which takes from four to six months), 
the owners will be deprived of a significant portion of the 
-7-
purchase price for an inordinate period of time. The sale# 
however, is structured in a manner most advantageous to the 
intervenor. The sale is structured in a manner that will 
require the owners to immediately pay all appropriate taxes 
on the entire gain realized from the transaction. But because 
of the onerous escrow agreement the owners will be hardpress-. 
ed to pay these taxes and will be precluded from going into 
any other business. Additionally/ all interest on investment 
proceeds during the escrow period will be the property of the 
intervenor. Other of the burdensome and unfair changes are 
apparent from a comparison of appellant's summary with the 
proposal and contract. 
This court's ruling requiring the owners to sell their 
interest to intervenor was predicated upon the determination 
that the owner's settlement had been reached after the in-
tervenor had acquired rights in the radio station's assets 
and it would not be fair to the intervenor to negate the 
sale. The owners, however, still must be deemed to have 
some rights in the matter. Permitting the sale to take place 
in a manner imposing an unfair burden on the owners by pre-
cluding them from taking advantage of other business oppor-
tunities and forcing them to pay taxes on a sale before they 
have actually realized a significant portion of the proceeds 
is not in accordance with the February proposal. This 
-8- 1 
result was neither contemplated nor proposed in the • 
February documents. It is unfair and unjust to impose this I 
result upon the owners simply because they have been found 
to have not made a timely resolution of their outstanding
 x- • 
differences* I 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits the trial court established a pro-
cedure for conducting the judicial sale which required I 
confirmation of the contract made by the receiver. Having * 
established such a procedure, the trial court could not 
later take action consistent with this procedure. It is I 
not proper for this court to condone the trial court's dis- i 
regard of its own procedure* 
Assuming the intervenor did require rights prior to the | 
time the owners settled their outstanding differences, such j 
rights were defined by the February proposal. The completed 
I 
contract contains onerous and unfair terms not included in j 
the February proposal. At a minimum, the owners are entitled 
to a contract which fairly and consistently comports to the 
February proposal. Appellant submits that a rehearing of 
this matter is justified on both grounds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REED L. MARTINEAU and 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
700 Continental Bank Building 
DEC 9 19^ 5 
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